Ich habe, mich niemals durch die Erklärung, welche die Logiker von einem Urteile überhaupt geben, befriedigen können: es ist, wie sie sagen, die Vorstellung eines Verhältnisses zwischen zwei Begriffen.
I have never been able to satisfy myself with the explanation that the logicians give of a judgement in general: it is, they say, the representation of a relation between two concepts.
I. Kant - Kritik der reinen Vernunft / Critique of Pure Reason
Jack tells Jill, ‘I love you too’. He could mean any one of several things, (a) that just as Jill loves him, so he loves her, (b) that he loves Jill and someone else too, (c) that like someone else, he too loves Jill, or (d) that he has love as well as some other feeling for Jill.
This led to the rapid development of sentential logic and first-order predicate logic, subsuming syllogistic reasoning, which was, therefore, after 2000 years, suddenly considered obsolete by many[original research?]. The Aristotelian system is explicated in modern fora of academia primarily in introductory material and historical study.
One notable exception to this modern relegation is the continued application of Aristotelian logic by officials of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and the Apostolic Tribunal of the Roman Rota, which still requires that arguments crafted by Advocates be presented in syllogistic format.
Much philosophy of logic is shaped, explicitly or implicitly, by the thought that logic is distinctively formal and abstracts from material content. The distinction between formal and material does not appear to coincide with the more familiar contrasts between a priori and empirical, necessary and contingent, analytic and synthetic—indeed, it is often invoked to explain these. Nor, it turns out, can it be explained by appeal to schematic inference patterns, syntactic rules, or grammar. What does it mean, then, to say that logic is distinctively formal?
